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Glossary of Abbreviations
A5

Article 5 (of the Anti-Personnel Mine Bane Convention)

ADP

Accelerated Demining Programme

APMBC

Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

AP

Anti-personnel

CCM

Convention on Cluster Munitions

CHA

Confirmed Hazardous Area

CND

Comissao Nacional de Desminagem
National Demining Commission

ERW

Explosive Remnants of War

FADM

Mozambican Armed Defence Force

GICHD

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining

IMAS

International Mine Action Standards

IND

Instituto Nacional de Desminagem
National Demining Institute

MAE

Ministry of State Administration

MoD

Ministry of Defence

MoI

Ministry of Interior

MRE

Mine Risk Education

NPA

Norwegian People’s Aid

NGO

Non-Governmental Organisation

OCHA

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ONUMOZ

UN Operation in Mozambique

PDC

Provincial demining Commission

QA

Quality Assurance

QC

Quality Control

QM

Quality Management

SHA

Suspected Hazardous Area

SOP

Standard Operating Procedure

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UXO

Unexploded Ordnance
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Executive Summary
Introduction
Mozambique is committed to having completed implementation of its mine clearance obligations
under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) by 1 January 2015. This
will, for the most part, mark the end of proactive demining efforts in Mozambique. It is
understood that it is always possible that previously unknown mined areas may be discovered
after completion has been declared.
With a view to being able to manage residual contamination once completion of international
treaty obligations has been declared and pro-active humanitarian demining efforts have ended,
Mozambique’s National Demining Institute (IND) requested that the GICHD to conduct an
assessment, looking at Mozambique’s national capacity to manage residual contamination.
The purpose of the assessment is to conduct a capacity assessment and mapping of the IND
and other relevant government institutions, and to present recommendations concerning the
transition of the IND and the establishment of a sustainable national capacity to manage and
respond to residual contamination.
The assessment team consisted of two GICHD advisors from the operations consulting division
and one Mozambican consultant. The team met with national and international stakeholders in
Maputo and in the two Northern Provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa.
What is residual contamination?
Residual contamination amounts to the sites or areas where mines and other explosive
remnants of war (ERW) are discovered after all suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and
confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) have been processed and considered fit for normal human
use (at least with respect to the surface and immediate subsurface of these areas).
Residual contamination does not amount to locations or areas which, on the basis of evidence
gathered through non-technical and/or technical survey and the analysis of any existing data
relevant to the associated site/area, are known by national authorities to be either SHAs or
CHAs.
Residual contamination in Mozambique
As of June 2014, the IND has declared a total of six out of 10 provinces to be mine-free:
 Cabo Delgado (2012)
 Niassa (2012)
 Nampula (2011)
 Zambezia (2010)
 Gaza (2012)
 Maputo (2014)
Completion of implementation of Article 5 by Mozambique will mark the end of pro-active
humanitarian demining efforts in Mozambique. As residual contamination is likely for any State
whose territory has been subject to the use of mines/explosive remnants of war (ERW),
Mozambique will need capacities to manage residual contamination as and when it is
discovered. The transition from a pro-active phase of humanitarian demining to a reactive phase
should ideally be accompanied by a restructuring and shift of the IND from the MoFA to a more
appropriate institutional home, given the expected problems and challenges at hand.
Findings and Recommendations
2 | 35

What is residual contamination?
Acknowledging the APMBC’s definition of a ‘mined area’ and IMAS’ definition of ‘residual risk’, it
is logical to define residual contamination as the sites or areas where mines and other ERW are
discovered after all confirmed or suspected hazardous areas have been processed and
considered fit for normal human use (at least with respect to the surface and immediate
subsurface of these areas).
Residual contamination does not amount to locations or areas which, on the basis of evidence
gathered through non-technical and/or technical survey and the analysis of any existing data
relevant to the associated site/area, are known by national authorities to be either confirmed or
suspected hazardous areas.
Recommendations:
 Develop a plan, detailing how areas that are currently categorised as ‘residual minefields’
will be analysed.
 Re-examine the information that led to areas being entered into the IMSMA database as
‘residual minefields.’ Carry out a desk assessment and revisit these areas to conduct
non-technical surveys to determine if there is any existing basis of evidence for them to
be considered suspected hazardous areas and if any can be cancelled. Regarding
recording areas as suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), it is important to underline that
the IMAS notes, “inaccessible areas, or areas with limited information available, should
not by default be recorded as SHA. SHAs should only be recorded in a database when
there is sufficient evidence to justify doing so.”1
 Re-classify remaining areas that are currently categorised as ‘residual minefields’ in
IMSMA, reflecting the findings of the above survey activities and analysis and develop a
technical survey and clearance plan to address the remaining suspected and/or
confirmed hazardous areas accordingly.
 Ensure IMSMA does not contain any areas categorised as ‘residual minefields’ while
proactive demining is still ongoing and until areas that are truly residual (previously
unknown) are discovered after all SHAs and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) have
been processed and considered fit for normal human use.
Extent and nature of the residual contamination problem
A clear understanding of the problem at hand is a precondition for predicting what the future
challenges are likely to be, and what national capacities will be needed to address them.
Assuming that the situation in the mine-free Northern provinces is indicative of what can be
expected in the rest of the country, one can predict that the residual contamination problem will
be limited, mainly consisting of UXO.
Recommendations:
 Develop sustainable national capacities that are appropriate to the Mozambican context.

1

IMAS 07.11, Land Release, March 2013, http://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/MAS/documents/imasinternational-standards/english/series-07/IMAS-07.11-Ed.1-Am2.pdf
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 Develop and sustain national EOD capacity within police. Given the identified strengths
and opportunities, the police is the most suitable actor to be responsible for addressing
residual UXO/ERW contamination (spot tasks).
 Allocate residual demining tasks to the FADM (area tasks).
Post-completion context and needs for a regulatory institute
The IND was established in 1999, mandated to carry out specific tasks, reflecting the problems
at the time. The transition from decades of proactive survey and mine clearance (by international
operators) to predominantly reactive responses to reported threats (to be dealt with by national
actors) will result in a new context with different problems and distinct needs.
Recommendations:
 Analyse future anticipated problem and develop national capacities accordingly.
 Develop a future regulatory structure and capacities based on actual needs;
ensure it is appropriate and sustainable.
 Secure a future regulatory institutional home within the MAE.
 Modify/renew the mandate as appropriate (name change).
National stakeholders, national ownership and sustainability
The transition from a proactive mine action programme to a reactive context is expected to be
accompanied by a shift to greater national ownership, including regarding managing the problem
and funding the activities. National commitment will be essential to ensure necessary resources
are made available.
Recommendation:
 Secure commitment to addressing residual contamination at the highest level of relevant
actors (MAE, MoI, MoD), through effective and regular coordination and information
sharing.
 Secure financial commitment for the costs associated with managing residual
contamination.
Roles and responsibilities
Mozambique’s transition to a residual contamination context will require a careful examination of
the various stakeholders involved, and an agreement on their respective roles and
responsibilities. Transparency and clarity will be essential to ensure effective and efficient
management of residual contamination, including coordination and information management.
The involvement of the Provincial Demining Commissions is likely to be greater in the future,
given the expected increased involvement of provincial government structures. It appears,
however, that the PDCs’ capacities and resources are at times limited and that their roles and
responsibilities would benefit from being clarified.

Recommendations:
 Develop a national policy and/or SOPs on the management of residual contamination,
defining key actors’ roles and responsibilities, including stipulating resource allocation
and division of labour.
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 Ensure reporting structures are transparent and known to everyone.
 Review and clarify the mandate, roles and responsibilities of the PDCs.
Information management: a precondition for effective coordination
Information management, including the management of the national IMSMA data base, is one of
IND’s key responsibilities. It will be crucial to ensure that relevant information is accurate,
accessible, available and up-to-date in a residual contamination context.
Recommendation:
 Ensure effective information management. Information related to future accidents and
activities should be collected, stored, analysed, updated and shared, to facilitate the
effective and efficient management of residual contamination.
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Introduction
Background to the assessment
Mozambique is committed to having completed implementation of its mine clearance obligations
under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) by 1 January 2015. This
will, for the most part, mark the end of proactive demining efforts in Mozambique.2 It is
understood that it is always possible that previously unknown mined areas may be discovered
after completion has been declared.
With a view to being able to manage residual contamination once completion of international
treaty obligations has been declared and pro-active humanitarian demining efforts have ended,
Mozambique’s National Demining Institute (IND) requested the GICHD to conduct an
assessment, looking at Mozambique’s national capacity to manage residual contamination.
The purpose of the assessment was to conduct a capacity assessment and mapping of the IND
and other relevant government institutions, and to present recommendations concerning the
transition of the IND and the establishment of a sustainable national capacity to manage and
respond to residual contamination.
The assessment team consisted of two GICHD advisors from the operations consulting division
and one Mozambican consultant. The assessment team met with national and international
stakeholders in Maputo and in the two Northern Provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa.
The assessment team conducted a debriefing with IND, presenting preliminary findings and
recommendations at the end of the assessment mission.

2

Mozambique also has reported that it has clearance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
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Current structure and status of the mine action
programme
International operators
A total of four international humanitarian mine action organisations currently operate in
Mozambique:





APOPO;
Handicap International (HI);
HALO Trust; and
NPA.

Commercial companies
A total of 52 commercial clearance companies, including two international (Bactec and
MECHEM), are currently registered in Mozambique.
Several informants expressed concern regarding the professionalism and quality of many of the
national commercial companies.
Mining and infrastructure companies commonly contract commercial clearance companies to
carry out verification before commencing work, something that is recommended by the IND. It
appears, however, that there are no formal protocols regulating this. The IND accredits all
commercial companies before they start operating. Due to a lack of resources, however, the IND
noted that accreditation procedures are not as thorough as they could be.

Mozambican Armed Defence Force (FADM)
Over the period 2002 – 2013, the FADM implemented clearance activities in the provinces of
Niassa, Nampula, Sofala, Gaza and Maputo.3 The assessment team was not in a position to
obtain more detailed information concerning FADM’s clearance activities and results; IND’s
information management unit informed that the national IMSMA data base does not include
FADM and police clearance statistics.
Several operators expressed concern regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of FADM’s
clearance operations, noting a lack of motivation and professionalism as key impediments to
effective and efficient operations.

Provincial Demining Commissions
With the view to enhance mine action coordination at the provincial and local levels, IND created
Provincial Demining Commissions (PDCs) in 2010 in the Provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa
and Zambezia. In the following years, IND continued to form PDCs and by 2014, PDCs were
created in nine out of ten provinces. The PDCs comprise representatives from the local
government, including the Provincial Governor’s Office, the Directorate of Planning and Finance,

3

Mozambique’s 2013 APMBC A5 Extension Request, ibid
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the Provincial Police Command, the army, the police, health services and the civil society.4
Additional stakeholders are in some cases represented, depending on the province.5
The PDCs have the following key responsibilities:6
1. Liaise with the IND in the process of planning, coordination and monitoring of demining
activities at the provincial level.
2. Propose annual demining priorities to their respective provincial governments, defined in
coordination with IND.
3. Report periodically to the provincial governments, with a view to solving the problem of
land mines and UXO.
4. Participate in national workshops on clearance on behalf of the respective provincial
governments.
5. Coordinate the activities undertaken by community civic education agents in preventing
mine/UXO accidents, and collecting information on suspected mined areas.
6. Work with health and social sectors in relation to assistance and socio-economic
reintegration of persons with disabilities, following mine/UXO accidents.
7. Participate in IND evaluations of demining activities at the provincial level, as part of the
validation of the results at the end of clearance operations.
Following the successful identification and clearance of all anti-personnel (AP) mines, IND
declared Maputo Province “mine-free” in March 2014. The Provincial Permanent Secretary of
the Maputo PDC noted three key tasks of the PDC:




raise awareness of mines/ERW in communities;
mobilise communities; and
report hazardous items.

When the public discovers a hazardous object, the Permanent Secretary informed that the
information is generally shared with community leaders, who report to the administrative/local
authority, who in turn informs the district level, who then reports to the defence and security
forces (police and FADM). The Permanent Secretary noted that, while this process is not
formally documented, it is “generally known / well established.”7
One landmine accident took place in Maputo Province after it was declared “mine-free” in March
2014, resulting in the death of a cow. HALO Trust informed the assessment team that it was
contacted by IND, who requested it to visit the site where the accident took place and to carry
out an investigation.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
UNDP has provided technical assistance to the Mozambique mine action programme since
1999. The structure and position of the UNDP international chief technical advisor (CTA) was,
from 2008 to 2011, supported under the project “Weapons Risk Mitigation and Mainstreaming
Mine Action, Small Arms and Light Weapons Controls 2008–2011”. The CTA position is
currently supported by the “Support to the National Demining Programme 2012–2015.” As part

4

Ibid.
For instance, the tourism industry is represented in the Inhambane commission and representatives from the
mineral resources sector are represented in the Tete commission.
6
ToR, Provincial Demining Commissions, IND and MoFA, 2008, unofficially translated version
7
Meeting with Maputo Provincial Demining Commission Permanent Secretary, 16 June 2014
5
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of its disaster relief and risk reduction efforts, the UN Development Assistance Framework for
Mozambique (UNDAF) 2012–2015 lists supporting Mozambique to meet its obligations under
Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.8

Towards Completion
Mozambique used to be one of the most heavily landmine affected countries in the world. The
country’s progress in identifying and clearing landmines is considered a great success. The
significant contribution of several international operators, in combination with a strengthened
IND, resulted in a mine action programme that deserves to be commended for its achievements.

International treaty obligations
The APMBC entered into force for Mozambique on 1 March 1999. In its initial transparency
report, Mozambique declared that it had obligations to demine under Article 5 of the Convention.
In 2008, Mozambique, believing that it was not possible to comply with its obligations by its 1
March 2009 deadline, requested and received an extended deadline to 1 March 2014. 9 In 2013,
realising it would not be possible to meet the 1 March 2014 deadline, Mozambique requested
and was granted a second extended deadline until 31 December 2014. At the Convention’s June
2014 Third Review Conference, Mozambique indicated that it was on track to complete
implementation by this second extended deadline.
The practical answer to what completion of the implementation of Article 5 of the Convention
means can be found in the definition of a ‘mined area’ in Article 2 of the Convention as ‘an area
which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.’10 Hence, ‘the
implementation of Article 5 requires that States Parties render all such areas no longer
dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of anti-personnel mines.’11 A State Party
that has reported one or more areas that fit the definition of ‘an area which is dangerous due to
the presence or suspected presence of mines’ will know that it has completed implementation
when it no longer has any areas under its jurisdiction or control that is ‘dangerous due to the
presence of suspected presence of mines.’12 As of September 2014, 28 States Parties (out of
59, for which this obligation has been relevant) had reported completion.
In 2006, the States Parties to the APMBC adopted a voluntary declaration of completion of A5
obligations. The purpose of the declaration is to ensure consistency among States Parties in
reporting completion and to ensure that it is grounded in the Convention’s legal text. ‘…the
declaration of completion sees that a State Party declares that it has done exactly what the State
Party has committed itself to doing in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1. Ambiguous
language and terminology, such as ‘mine-free’ or ‘impact-free’ is absent from this declaration.’ 13

8

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, http://www.themonitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3690
9
Mozambique : Request for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in
mined areas in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 2008,
http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/clearing-minedareas/art5_extensions/countries/Mozambique-ExtRequest-Received-6May2008.pdf
10
APMBC, http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/text_status/Ottawa_Convention_English.pdf
11
ISU, Understanding Mine Clearance in the Context of the AP Mine Ban Convention, 2011,
http://www.apminebanconvention.org/publications-about-the-convention/mine-clearance/
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
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The adoption of the declaration of completion was the first formal acknowledgment by States
Parties that, following completion, residual contamination may be a reality. The declaration
allows for the possibility for States Parties to express that there remains a risk that previously
unknown mined areas may be discovered, after the declaration of completion. The declaration
further lists the practical steps that a State Party would take in accordance with the Convention,
if it discovers previously unknown mined areas:
[State] declares that it has destroyed [ensured the destruction of] all anti-personnel
mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines were
known or suspected to be emplaced, in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention.
[State] declares that it completed this obligation on [date].
In the event that previously unknown mined areas are discovered after this date,
[State] will:
(i) report such mined areas in accordance with its obligations under Article 7 and share such
information through any other informal means such as the Intersessional Work Programme,
including the Standing Committee meetings;
(ii) ensure the effective exclusion of civilians in accordance with Article 5; and
(iii) destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in these mined areas as a
matter of urgent priority, making its needs for assistance known to other States Parties, as
appropriate.14
It should be noted that Mozambique is also a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions
(CCM), a convention that entered into force on 1 September 2011. Mozambique has reported
that it has an obligation ‘to clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster
munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or
control’, in accordance with Article 4 of the CCM.15 Mozambique anticipates having completed
implementation of this obligation ‘no later than 2016.’16

What is residual contamination?
The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) define, in the context of humanitarian demining,
residual risk as ‘the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove
and/or destroy all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.’17
Building upon this, it is logical to define residual contamination as the sites or areas where mines
and other ERW are discovered after all SHAs and CHAs have been processed and considered
fit for normal human use (at least with respect to the surface and immediate subsurface of these
areas). Residual contamination does not amount to locations or areas which, on the basis of
evidence gathered through non-technical and/or technical survey and the analysis of any

14

Ibid.
Convention on Cluster Munitions: http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/01/Convention-ENG.pdf
16 th
4 meeting of States parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Statement of Mozambique on clearance
and risk reduction, delivered by Alberto Augusto, IND Director,
http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2013/09/MOZ-Statement-on-Clearance-and-Risk-Reduction-Lusaka-ingles11.09.2013.pdf
17
IMAS 04.10, Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations, 2003,
http://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/MAS/documents/imas-international-standards/english/series04/IMAS-04-10-Ed2-Am6.pdf
15
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existing data relevant to the associated site/area, are known by national authorities to be either
SHAs or CHAs.
Mozambique has included sites that are inaccessible for conventional demining as ‘residual
minefields’ in IMSMA (i.e. 116,105 square metres in Inhambane district and 750 square metres
in Tete).18 Following the logic above, these areas do not amount to residual contamination, as
they are already known. Further analysis through non-technical surveys needs to be conducted,
to determine if these areas are ‘mined areas’, as defined by the APMBC, or if they can be
cancelled, based on evidence.

18

Information shared by IND, June 2014, available in Annex II.
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History of Developing National Capacities
National Mine Action Plan
Mozambique’s National Mine Action Plan 2008 – 2014 includes a target on national capacities
and residual contamination:
TARGET 5. By 2010 establish sustainable mechanisms for national capacity to
handle residual mine and UXO issues
Objective 5.1

Identify the entity that will be responsible for residual demining
issues;

Objective 5.2

Take action on the management and implementation of residual
tasks including coordinating MRE and facilitating assistance to
mines and UXO victims.

Objective 5.3

Analyse IND’s role and its relations with other government and
program partners, as international humanitarian demining operators
conclude their work.

The target is accompanied by six “main tasks:”







identify the entity that will deal with residual mine and UXO issues;
build the capacity of the entity that will deal with residual mine and UXO issues;
implement a system for coordinating MRE in districts affected by mines and UXO;
establish a system for collecting information on mine victims in order to facilitate
assistance to them;
draw up an action plan for the management and implementation of residual demining
tasks and identify requirements in order to ensure continued assistance to mine victims
and MRE; and
include the requirements of landmine and UXO issues, MRE and AVSM in the budget of
provincial governments.

The substantial references to the management of residual contamination in Mozambique’s
National Mine Action Plan is a clear indication that the topic has been on the radar for several
years.

Workshop on defining the end-state
IND organised a workshop on ‘Defining the end-state: what is expected of Mozambique in order
to declare compliance with Article 5.1 of the Landmine Convention’ in Maputo in November
2012. The workshop brought several stakeholders together, including ISU, IND, operators and
donors. The workshop’s last session focused Mozambique’s national capacity to address
residual contamination. The workshop report notes that IND recognises that a residual threat
from UXO and other ERW will remain after demining is concluded, highlighting the lack of mine
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maps, indicating exactly where the landmines were placed; and that there are still many
uninhabited and unexplored areas, where it is possible that mined areas may be discovered
after Mozambique’s declaration of compliance with A5.19
The ISU recommended the IND to look into issues related to:20
 educating the population about ERW hazards and who will the communities contact
when they find a UXO;
 developing legislation, policies and procedures to address the residual ERW threat;
 training local authorities on how to respond to UXO hazards;
 establishing regulations regarding the use of land for hazardous activities;
 regulating hazardous activities and how;
 the chain of communication when a suspicious item is found;
 investigating and securing the item and the site;
 removing or destroying the items;
 establishing and enforcing the standards on responses; and
 information management.

Training initiatives
The FADM
US Africa Command (AFRICOM)21 has conducted a series of training initiatives targeting the
FADM since 2011.
Thirty-eight Mozambican soldiers successfully completed a three-week demining training course
in Maputo taught by five US Navy EOD technicians in June 2011. The course, a partnership
between AFRICOM and FADM, was the first initiative to train FADM in demining and EOD.22
An AFRICOM representative has, however, pointed out that AFRICOM is reluctant to implement
further training activities with FADM, due to concerns related to lack of accountability and
commitment on behalf of FADM. Equipment provided to the FADM, including five vehicles,
reportedly “disappeared”, implying concerns related to accountability and trust.

The Police
The IND contracted South African commercial company MECHEM in 2010, to conduct four EOD
level 1 and 2 courses to IND staff and members of the police force. MECHEM organised four
courses in Quelimane (Zambezia Province), Nampula (Nampula), Pemba (Cabo Delgado) and
Lichinga (Niassa).
MECHEM trained a total of 51 individuals (IND staff and police members), of which 46
successfully passed the theoretical and practical tests. Out of these, a total of 32 police officers
successfully completed the courses. The four-week courses started with seven days of EOD

19

IND workshop report, shared by IND, September 2014.
Ibid.
21
http://www.africom.mil/
22
http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Article/8441/soldiers-take-first-step-in-combating-mozambiques20
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theory, followed by practical EOD training. The participants then spent the remaining time on
addressing previously recorded hazards and conducting EOD activities, including demolitions. 23
MECHEM assessed course participants through a written examination, a practical assessment,
continuous evaluation and individual course reports for each participant.
MECHEM highlighted a number of challenges during the EOD training, including related to the
following areas:






insufficient storage facilities to safeguard explosives;
lack of police transport for deployment;
inadequate financial police resources to purchase necessary equipment, including
sandbags and insulating tape;
no sleeping facilities for the police during deployments; and
problems with detonators used.

MECHEM noted that students were “eager to learn”, and that everyone passed the theoretical
and practical tests.
Looking forward, MECHEM highlights a few issues in its consolidated training report:




police members should work together as a team to support each other;
if possible, trained IND members should be available to support police members when
dealing with ERW; and
all trained police members should receive basic demining/BAC training.

IND has shared a number of lessons learnt regarding the EOD training in the Northern
provinces:24






the police assumed responsibility and continued to use equipment donated to identify
and destroy UXO discovered by the civilian population;
the police provided report to the IND on activities completed on an irregular basis;
additional refresher training, training on reporting in accordance with IMSMA and
replacement of consumable equipment is needed;
the police needs a clear structure for the trained staff. The IND recommends the
formation of provincial Bomb Squads or integration of the trained police into the Rapid
Reaction Force; and
standard operating procedures (SOPs) are needed to outline the responsibilities of
various actors at the national, provincial and district levels.

More recently, the IND contracted AFRICOM to conduct Training of Trainer (ToT) with the IND
Mobile Training Teams in 2012 – 2014.
AFRICOM will continue to support the IND with the development and equipment of three Mobile
Training Teams until October 2015, with a view that the teams will be used to train the police to
address residual contamination, once proactive mine clearance operations are completed in
December 2014.

23
24

MECHEM Consolidated report: EOD training on behalf of IND, Mozambique 5 October 2010 - 23 March 2011
Presentation by Alberto Maverengue Augusto, Director of IND, during 13 MSP, Geneva, December 2013
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The objective of AFRICOM’s involvement is to ‘build capacity with local police and government
agencies in EOD/ERW operations, disposal of obsolete ammunitions stockpiles, saving life
under hazardous conditions, quality assurance (QA) and Land Release procedures. These
Train-the-Trainer missions are designed to put IND as the lead agency in build countrywide
capacity with local government in the disposal of explosive remnants of war (ERW) upon the
conclusion of demining operations in December 2014.’ 25
The proposed dates for AFRICOM’s training are:




November 2014 - Gaza
May 2015 - Maputo
September 2015 - Inhambane

AFRICOM proposes that each mobile team should be equipped with a specific “package”,
facilitating EOD operations.26
IND informed that the plan is to have 10 EOD-trained police officers in each Province by the end
of 2015. IND has further suggested that EOD training should be included in the general training
at the police academy.

25
26

AFRICOM, draft concept of operations to support Mozambique HMA FY15, shared by AFRICOM, July 2014
List of equipment package available in Annex III.
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Addressing Residual Contamination
Northern Provinces
As of June 2014, IND has declared a total of six provinces to be ‘mine-free’:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Cabo Delgado (2012)
Niassa (2012)
Nampula (2011)
Zambezia (2010)
Gaza (2012)
Maputo (2014)

Proactive large scale humanitarian demining effectively came to an end in four northern
provinces when HALO completed the “Mine Impact Free District” (MIFD) survey and closed its
programme in the North in 2007. The MIFD survey resulted in the Mozambican Government
formalizing and adopting the “Mine Free District” (MFD) Process, completed by 2012.
Between 1994 and 2007, HALO reported the destruction of 100,840 mines and 22,329 items of
UXO in the Northern provinces. In comparison, during the finalisation of the MFD process
between 2008 and 2012, 31 mines and 321 UXO were found and destroyed.
The GICHD travelled to three northern provinces (Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa) together
with two IND staff members, to better understand the extent and nature of the residual
contamination problem, and the level of national capacities that currently address it.
Below is a brief summary of key findings from meetings in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. Meetings
in Nampula were unfortunately cancelled due to the arrival of the First Lady in the province. It
should be noted that as far as the IND is aware, the Nampula PDC has not yet been established.
In addition, there have been no reported EOD call-outs, which may account for the limited
interest at the level of the Provincial Government in Niassa. Cluster bomb stockpiles, stored at
the Nacala military ammunition store in Nampala, are currently being dealt with by NPA (with
support from Fenix Insight Ltd), who are assisting with their safe management and disposal.
Cabo Delgado: key findings








the public reports any suspected explosive objects to community leaders, who are
instructed to inform the police/district government;
commercial ‘verification’ takes place in conjunction with infrastructure/mining activities;
the PDC is functional (regular meetings);
the police conducts EOD call outs, often jointly with military engineers;
transportation is a key challenge;
the level of contamination is low. One item has been reported so far in 2014, a total of
three EOD call outs took place in 2013; and
police members who completed the 2010 EOD training are posted across the province,
which means they do not work as a unified team; this is the principal reason they
respond to call outs with the military engineers to form up a team, a collaboration that
appears to be working well.

Niassa: key findings



no additional mines have been discovered since IND declared it a “mine-free” province;
there is a limited UXO problem (police/FADM destroyed a total of 30 UXO in 2013);
occasional hazardous items are reported to, and managed by, the police;
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the PDC exists on paper but does not seem to be active in practice. The role and
responsibilities of the PDC are not clear;
since 2011 there have been issues with funding equipment and transport. The police
have been effectively inactive since 2013, as there are no more detonators and limited
explosives. They have been marking reported items but have not carried out any
demolitions; as of June 2014, there were 11 outstanding spot tasks;
the police expects the IND to provide equipment, whereas this should be the
responsibility of the provincial government;
the police have records of EOD work, and keep a list of outstanding call outs (11);
all EOD work has been reported to the IND; and
roles and responsibilities of the PDC and the police need to be clarified.

Nature and extent of residual contamination
A review of clearance results and the contamination situation in the Northern provinces provides
a good overview of the extent and nature of the residual contamination problem postOf the total 31 mines found, 14 were destroyed during EOD call outs while 17 were found during
clearance operations. Out of the 42 areas cleared after 2007, 17 mines were found in seven
areas; no mines were found in 35 of the cleared areas (UXO items were found in seven of the 35
areas). In the areas where mines were found, four areas had one mine only. The fact that 35
areas were cleared, without discovering any mines, and that a further 15 areas were entirely
cancelled suggest that there is a need for more efficient and effective survey, to avoid
unnecessary clearance. This information also highlights the importance of implementing
effective handover and reporting procedures, including inclusive information sharing, to ensure
that the level of confidence in the released land is as high as possible, and that the
survey/clearance/cancellation activities are accurately recorded at all relevant levels.
In summary, clearance information from the four Northern provinces illustrates that around
100,000 mines were reported as destroyed as a result of large-scale, proactive demining
between 1994 and 2007. In the finalisation of the IND-adopted MFD process by 2012, only 17
mines were reported as destroyed from seven areas. As reported during the assessment visits
to the north, items of UXO have been identified since 2013, but they are isolated and low in
number.

National capacities needed to manage and address residual contamination
Mozambique’s national capacities should be developed and structured to respond to the
anticipated residual contamination problems in the most effective and efficient manner. It is
imperative that national capacities correspond to the actual needs on the ground, that they are
appropriate to the Mozambican context and sustainable; appreciating the available human and
financial resources.
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Responsible actors: EOD and mine clearance
The FADM
As mentioned above, AFRICOM started training the FADM in 2011, through an eight-week
demining and EOD training. AFRICOM has also donated equipment to the FADM, including
vehicles, metal detectors and PPEs.
The FADM has been involved in clearance activities, responsible for specific tasks, including
around an Army ammunition deposit in Inhambane province, in collaboration with HI.27 Based on
several meetings with stakeholders in Mozambique, the assessment team can conclude that
there is a general scepticism regarding FADM’s capabilities to conduct effective and efficient
demining and to manage resources in an accountable and transparent manner.
It is clear that AFRICOM’s collaboration with FADM was fraught with challenges. A senior
AFRICOM staff member, heavily involved in the training, noted several challenges related to the
FADM, while underlying his reluctance to work with them again. Lack of motivation was
highlighted as the principal challenge within FADM. In summary, key challenges include issues
related to:




accountability;
transparency; and
information-sharing.

The Police
As outlined above, MECHEM’s training of police officers in the northern provinces has resulted
in some EOD capacity within the police force.
Stakeholders agreed that it is appropriate to develop an EOD capacity within the police, stating
several reasons, including:




EOD training is already underway, a high degree of commitment has been noted;
the police have a great geographical coverage and visibility, as they are present in most
areas of Mozambique; and
the police are, for many communities, the “natural” entity to report safety-related issues
to, including suspicious hazardous objects.

Given the widespread presence of the police, they could play an important role in the reporting
chain, serving as the first point of contact for communities, when suspicious hazardous object
are reported. Their key responsibility would be to secure the area, ensure the safety of the local
population, to conduct EOD (if they have the technical expertise and necessary resources) and
to report to the coordinating body.
Key challenges related to the police’s ability to effectively take on the responsibility to address
residual contamination include:



lack of resources and limited capacity;
concerns related to the effectiveness of its chain of command;

27

The task was reportedly divided into two parts. HI cleared one area and the Army cleared the second half. HI
reportedly conducted QA of the area cleared by the Army. (Interview with HI Mine Action Coordinator, Maputo
June 2014)
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some informants have reservations concerning the police taking on more responsibilities,
such as addressing residual contamination, and question what their incentive would be, if
not accompanied by increased pay; and
there is a general concern that placing the police in charge of EOD/demining risks
resulting in inefficient and ineffective activities, with poor results.

Post-completion regulatory institution
The IND has since its creation in 1999 fallen under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), a
decision viewed as appropriate and strategic, as it resulted in significant international exposure
for the mine action programme; instrumental in securing international funding and support.
Presidential Decree No. 18/95 of May 1999 that established the IND mandates the institution to
carry out certain tasks, responding to the specific context and needs of a country severely
affected by landmines. The mandate includes to: draft policies and strategies, define demining
priorities, produce action plans and lead, coordinate and control mine clearance activities in
Mozambique. Key responsibilities also include monitoring, quality control and information
management.28
The transition from a pro-active phase of humanitarian demining to a reactive phase should
ideally be accompanied by a restructuring and shift of the IND from the MoFA to a more
appropriate institutional home, given the expected problems and challenges at hand.
Acknowledging the above-mentioned transition, it is important to examine the needs that a
residual contamination context will bring about. As highlighted above, the residual contamination
problem in provinces declared “mine-free” can provide a useful indication of what can be
expected in remaining provinces, where proactive mine clearance is still ongoing. A brief
analysis of available residual contamination information from Niassa and Cabo Delgado
provinces illustrates that the residual contamination has been predominantly UXO, with only one
landmine reported so far.
Given the nature and extent of the residual contamination problem (based on the situation in the
Northern provinces), a future regulatory institution may have the following key responsibilities:




information and knowledge management;
EOD training; and
accreditation / quality assurance (including of commercial companies).

Future home of a regulatory institution: key options
The MoFA commissioned an internal study in 2013, looking into the transition of a number of
institutes (including IND), that currently fall under the MoFA. The study concludes that, once
Mozambique is declared mine free, IND should be transferred from the MoFA to the ministry of
Defence (MoD). It further recommends that a specific mine action unit should be established
within the MoD.

28

APMBC A5 extension request, 2008, ibid.
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The assessment team met with senior representatives from key ministries, considered to be
potential options for IND’s future institutional home.29 Below is a brief summary of opportunities
and challenges related to ministerial options for a future institutional home.
The MoD
Opportunities
A limited number of informants pointed out that a future institutional home within the MoD may
facilitate coordination with mine action programmes in neighbouring countries, in particular
Zimbabwe.30
Challenges
Most respondents expressed concern at the prospect of a future institute being housed at the
MoD.
Transparency and accountability
Given the sensitive nature of the MoD’s role and responsibilities, there is a concern that this
could result in limited transparency and accountability which could negatively impact on future
clearance activities and information-sharing. Most informants explicitly pointed out that they fear
that a future institutional home within the MoD could jeopardise transparent activities and sound
information management, including information-sharing. Concerns related to the management of
residual contamination being politicised should it fall under the MoD were also expressed by
several informants.
The fact that the MoD is a centralised ministry could represent an additional challenge in the
future management of residual contamination, given the importance of sound coordination and
collaboration with provincial governments and local communities.
The Ministry of Interior (MoI)
Opportunities
The fact that the police falls under the MoI may mean that the MoI would be in a good position to
coordinate with the police and to encourage it to implement future EOD activities in the most
effective and efficient manner. Some informants underlined the MoI’s level of authority and the
positive influence this could have in a residual contamination context, in which the police would
most likely play an increasingly important role. It appears that the MoI is generally viewed as
more transparent than the MoD.
Challenges
Some informants highlighted concerns related to MOI’s credibility and transparency. For
example, one reference was made to Mozambique’s riot police (Forca de intervencao rapida
(FIR)), which has been criticised for excessive use of violence during the recent local elections.

29

Not in order of preference.
MoD noted that the Zimbabwe Mine Action centre (ZMAC) preferred to liaise with the MoD rather than the IND, given the
military profile of the ZMAC.
30
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The Ministry of Administration and Territorial Affairs (MAE)
The MAE is responsible for the administration of the laws overseeing local government.31 Local
government is enshrined in the constitution as amended by Law No. 9/96: The tasks of local
authorities are to:




organise the participation of citizens in finding a solution to the community problems;
promote local development; and
strengthen and consolidate democracy within the framework of Mozambican state unity.

Opportunities
Previous experience
The National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) transferred from the MoFA to the MAE in
2005. This shift is generally seen as a success by external partners and the Government of
Mozambique. The principal rationale behind the move was the changing environment; under the
MoFA, the INGC’s principal responsibility was to receive and disperse international funding to
relevant implementing actors. In contrast, under the MAE, the INCG is directly responsible for
managing disasters. The INGC’s transfer from the MoFA to the MAE was accompanied by a
shift in funding from disaster management activities being predominantly internationally funded
to relying primarily on national funding. The INGC underlined that the ease with which its
institutional home shifted from the MoFA to the MAE was partly due to a general change in the
disaster management approach in Mozambique. The new approach, in combination with the
shift in funding sources resulted in an agreement that the MoFA would no longer be an
appropriate institutional home.
Community connections
In contrast to the MoD, the MAE is decentralised and, thanks to its mandate, regarded as the
Ministry with the closest connections with local communities, something that would be valuable
in the future management of residual contamination.
Approachable
The MAE is further regarded as an “open” and approachable ministry, a precondition for the
effective facilitation of future coordination and information-sharing with the relevant actors,
including at the provincial and district levels.
Challenges
Some stakeholders expressed concern that the MAE may not have enough “authority” to house
a future institution in the most effective manner, keeping in mind that coordination with the police
and the FADM will be essential. Regardless of this potential limitation, however, informants still
regard the MAE as the most appropriate home for a future institution.

31

http://www.clgf.org.uk/userfiles/1/files/Mozambique%20local%20government%20profile%202011-12.pdf
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Findings and Recommendations
What is residual contamination?
Acknowledging the APMBC’s definition of a ‘mined area’ and IMAS’ definition of ‘residual risk’, it
is logical to define residual contamination as the sites or areas where mines and other ERW are
discovered after all confirmed or suspected hazardous areas have been processed and
considered fit for normal human use (at least with respect to the surface and immediate
subsurface of these areas).
Residual contamination does not amount to locations or areas which, on the basis of evidence
gathered through non-technical and/or technical survey and the analysis of any existing data
relevant to the associated site/area, are known by national authorities to be either confirmed or
suspected hazardous areas.
Recommendations:
 Develop a plan, detailing how areas that are currently categorised as ‘residual minefields’
will be analysed.
 Re-examine the information that led to areas being entered into the IMSMA database as
‘residual minefields.’ Carry out a desk assessment and revisit these areas to conduct
non-technical surveys to determine if there is any existing basis of evidence for them to
be considered suspected hazardous areas and if any can be cancelled. Regarding
recording areas as SHAs, it is important to underline that the IMAS notes, “inaccessible
areas, or areas with limited information available, should not by default be recorded as
SHA. SHAs should only be recorded in a database when there is sufficient evidence to
justify doing so.”32
 Re-classify remaining areas that are currently categorised as ‘residual minefields’ in
IMSMA, reflecting the findings of the above survey activities and analysis and develop a
technical survey and clearance plan to address the remaining suspected and/or
confirmed hazardous areas accordingly.
 Ensure IMSMA does not contain any areas categorised as ‘residual minefields’ while
proactive demining is still ongoing and until areas that are truly residual (previously
unknown) are discovered after all SHAs and CHAs have been processed and considered
fit for normal human use.

Extent and nature of the residual contamination problem
A clear understanding of the problem at hand is a precondition for predicting what the future
challenges are likely to be, and what national capacities will be needed to address them.
Assuming that the situation in the ‘mine-free’ Northern Provinces is indicative of what can be
expected in the rest of the country, one can predict that the residual contamination problem will
be limited, mainly consisting of UXO.

32

IMAS 07.11, Land Release, March 2013, http://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/MAS/documents/imasinternational-standards/english/series-07/IMAS-07.11-Ed.1-Am2.pdf
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Recommendations:
 Develop sustainable national capacities that are appropriate to the Mozambican context.
 Develop and sustain national EOD capacity within the police. Given the identified
strengths and opportunities, the police is the most suitable actor to be responsible for
addressing residual UXO/ERW contamination (spot tasks).
 Allocate residual demining tasks to the FADM (area tasks).

Post-completion context and needs for a regulatory institute
The IND was established in 1999, mandated to carry out specific tasks, reflecting the problems
at the time. The transition from decades of proactive survey and mine clearance (by international
operators) to predominantly reactive responses to reported threats (to be dealt with by national
actors) will result in a new context with different problems and distinct needs.
Recommendations:
 Analyse future anticipated problem and develop capacities accordingly.
 Develop a future regulatory structure and capacities based on actual needs;
ensure it is appropriate and sustainable.
 Secure a future regulatory institutional home within the MAE.
 Modify/renew the mandate as appropriate (name change).

National stakeholders, national ownership and sustainability
The transition from a proactive mine action programme to a post-completion context is expected
to be accompanied by a shift to greater national ownership, including regarding managing the
problem and funding the activities. National commitment will be essential to ensure necessary
resources are made available.
Recommendation:
 Secure commitment to addressing residual contamination at the highest level of relevant
actors (MAE, MoI, MoD), through effective and regular coordination and information
sharing.
 Secure financial commitment for the costs associated with managing residual
contamination.

Roles and responsibilities
Mozambique’s transition to a residual contamination context will require a careful examination of
the various stakeholders involved, and an agreement on their respective roles and
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responsibilities. Transparency and clarity will be essential to ensure effective and efficient
management of residual contamination, including coordination and information management.
The involvement of the PDCs is likely to be greater in the future, given the expected increased
involvement of provincial government structures. It appears, however, that the PDCs’ capacities
and resources are at times limited and that their roles and responsibilities would benefit from
being clarified.
Recommendations:
 Develop a national policy and/or SOPs on the management of residual contamination,
defining key actors’ roles and responsibilities, including stipulating resource allocation
and division of labour.
 Ensure reporting structures are transparent and known to everyone.
 Review and clarify the mandate, roles and responsibilities of the PDCs.

Information management: a precondition for effective coordination
Information management, including the management of the national IMSMA data base, is one of
IND’s key responsibilities. It will be crucial to ensure that relevant information is accurate,
accessible, available and up-to-date in a residual contamination context.
Recommendation:
 Ensure effective information management. Information related to future accidents and
activities should be collected, stored, analysed, updated and shared, to facilitate the
effective and efficient management of residual contamination.
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Annexes
Annex I: Assessment TOR

TERMS OF REFERENCE
CAPACITY ASSESSMENT AND MAPPING OF
NATIONAL CAPACITY TO MANAGE RESIDUAL UXO AND OTHER ERW
1.

BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION

After more than 20 years of demining operations, Mozambique is nearing completion of active
demining operations in accordance with its obligations under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention. The Government of Mozambique’s National Demining Institute (IND) has
presented a plan to conclude demining of all known mined areas by 31 December 2014. This
achievement mark a significant milestone for a country once-considered to be one of the most
heavily affected in the world. However, like any country that has suffered through modern
warfare, Mozambique will face a continuing threat from residual UXO and other Explosive
Remnants of War for years to come. In order to address the residual threat from UXO in
provinces where all known mined areas are already cleared, the UNDP and IND have conducted
some training and equipping of the police in Explosive Ordinance Disposal. As well, Provincial
Mine Action Commissions have been established in 9 of the 10 provinces to help coordinate
demining operations at a provincial and local level. Provincial Demining Commissions are also
intended to play a role in coordinated and reporting on any UXO or ERW incidents after
deminers have concluded operations in the province.

Over the years, the Government of Mozambique and International Partners have made
significant investments to build a national Mine Action Coordination Centre, namely the IND, that
has the responsibility to coordinate all activities related to Mine Action in Mozambique. Once the
objective of clearing all of the known mined areas in Mozambique has been completed, the
future of IND is unclear.

As part of the UNDP’s project to ‘Support the National Demining Programme’, the UNDP and the
Government of Mozambique are interested in conducting a forward looking capacity assessment
and mapping to assess how the existing capacity of the IND and other government institutions
can be adapted to provide a sustainable national capacity capable of addressing the long-term
residual threat of UXO and other ERW after the completion of large-scale active demining
operations. In this manner, the UNDP and partners intend to ensure that the capacity and
investment in the IND is not lost following the completion of demining and that a sustainable
national capacity is in place to ensure an appropriate response to the threat to civilians’ safety
and security posed by residual UXO and ERW.

2.

OVERALL OBJECTIVE
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To conduct a capacity assessment and mapping of the IND and other relevant government
institutions that will provide recommendations to the Government of Mozambique for the
transition of IND and the establishment of a sustainable national capacity to the manage and
respond to residual UXO and ERW issues in Mozambique.

3.

SCOPE

To accomplish the above objective the capacity assessment and mapping exercise should
include the following topics:







4.

The mandate and legislative framework of IND and mine action operations in
Mozambique
National Legislation and regulatory framework for the production, transfer, stockpile and
use of explosives in Mozambique
Structure and mapping of relevant capacities for management of residual UXO and ERW
in the IND, including but not limited to:
o licensing and contracting of operators;
o establishment and maintenance of national standards;
o Quality Assurance and Quality Control of mine action activities;
o Information Management
Review and Capacity Assessment of the Provincial Demining Commissions
Review of mandates and capacities of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense,
Ministry of Planning and Development and Ministry of Administration and State Affairs
(MAE)
METHODOLOGY

The capacity assessment will require research to be conducted in Maputo Mozambique and
possible visits to Provincial capitals. The following methodology should be used to achieve the
objectives of the survey:

5.



Desktop research



Key informant interviews with inter alia:
o

National Demining Institute including Director and heads of departments

o

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

o

Ministry of Interior

o

Ministry of Defence

o

Ministry of Planning and Development

o

Ministry of Administration and Territorial Affairs (MAE)

o

National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC)

o

Armed Defense Forces of Mozambique (FADM) Engineering Unit

o

Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM)

o

Provincial Demining Commissions

o

Humanitarian Demining Operators (Apopo, Halo Trust, Handicap International)

EXPECTED RESULTS AND DELIVERABLES
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Research conducted for the capacity assessment and mapping exercise should result in the
following key deliverables:
1) A final report to include a listing of all relevant actors, their capacities and possible future
roles in the management of explosives and residual threats from UXO and ERW. The
final report should also include key recommendations to provide guidance on the
following questions:
a. How can the government of Mozambique best utilize the capacity of IND in the
future to address residual threats of UXO and management of explosives in
Mozambique?
b. What should be done with the current IND database of clearance records to
ensure it is available for future use?
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Annex II: Individuals interviewed
Name

Title

Organisation

Alberto Augusto

Director

IND

Antonio Belchior Vaz Martins

Head, Operations
Department

IND

Thomas Cuve

Chief of Human R esources

IND

Robert Afreda

Information Management
Advisor

NPA

Mario Inacio Omia

Provincial Permanent
Secretary

Maputo Provincial Demining
Commission

Joao Tiago Meneses
Machado Ribeiro

Director General

National Institute for Disaster
Management (INGC)

Oliver Hyde-Smith

Programme Manager

HALO Trust

Coronel Dias Esquinar
Jaqueta

Head, Engineering, Army
Command

Ministry of Defence

Tess Tewelde

Programme Manager

APOPO

Jack Holly

HMA Programme Manager

USAFRICOM

Lewis Gitter

Political Officer

Embassy of the U.S.

Aderito Ismael

Mine Action Coordinator

Handicap International (HI)

Zefanias Senete Mabie
Muhate

Permanent Secretary

Ministry of Interior

Alvaro Manhique

Chief of Command, Police

Placido Nerino Pereira

National Director

Ministry of State Administration
(MAE)

Itsuroh Abe

Coordinator for Economic
Cooperation

Embassy of Japan

Filipe Chidumo

Permanent Secretary

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
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cooperation
Sara Bernard

Chief, OSC Mozambique

Embassy of the US

Stephen du Preez

Portfolio Manager
Operations, Country
Manager, Mozambique

MECHEM

Mario Nunes

Programme Manager

NPA

Jemima Gordon-Duff

Governance Adviser

DfID

Policarpo de Rogerio Napica

Director (representing the
Permanent Secretary
Provincial Government)

DPCA (Ministry of Environment)

Chavier Nira

EOD Officer

Provincial Police Cabo Delgado

Veronica Ernesto Langa

Permanent Secretary
(Provincial Demining
Commission)

Provincial Government Niassa

Joaquim Nibo

Police Commander

Provincial Police Niassa

Filipe Henrique Gelo

Director de Departamento
de Protecao

Provincial Police Niassa
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Annex II: IND contamination maps

As of June 2014, the number of remaining tasks by Province is illustrated in table below:
Province

Remaining Tasks Area Suspended (sqm) Area On Going (sqm) Residual Area (sqm) Open Area (sqm)

Inhambane

43

0

0

116,105

104,120

Manica

108

11,878

403,382

0

586,289

Sofala

317

190,865

20,793

0

2,893,104

Tete

10

0

20,437

750

1,328,445

Grand Total

478

202,743

444,612

116,855

4,911,958
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Annex III: AFRICOM equipment package for mobile teams
Proposed Equipment Package per Mobile Team
 Minelab Detectors x 4
 Vallons w/Large Loops x 2
 Shonstat metal detector x 1
 Demo Box x 1
 PPE x 4 sets
 Demining Tool Sets x 4
 Hook and Line Kit x 1
 Range Finder x 1
 Binos x 1
 GPS x 1
 Video Package x 1
 Lesson Guides
 Student Guides
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